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MAKING SENSE OF SCHAUMBURG:
SEEKING COHERENCE IN FIRST
AMENDMENT CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
LAW
JOHN D. INAZU
The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a trilogy of cases in the
1980s: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1980), Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co. (1984), and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina
(1988). Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content analysis, tiered scrutiny,
and commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to articulate a coherent
framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result has left the Court wit hout
a clear rationale for the value of charitable solicitation and lower courts without a workable test for
evaluating regulations affecting this form of speech: the Eighth and Tenth Circuits interpret
Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict
scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the Court has been “unclear” about the
appropriate standard.
After examining the Court‟s approach to charitable solicitation, I propose a new test that
incorporates current notions of content analysis and tiered scrutiny and better accounts for the
speaker-based interests tied to charitable solicitation. My normative approach adopts a “civic
conception of free speech” that is cognizant of the matters of public concern advanced both directly
and indirectly through charitable solicitation. I conclude that a balancing of interests offers a more
appropriate review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome formulations arising
out of the Schaumburg trilogy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a
trilogy of cases in the 1980s: Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,1 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,2 and
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina.3 Owing largely
to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and
commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to articulate a
coherent framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The
result has left lower courts unable to judge ―the ends which the several rules
seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up
to gain them, and whether they are worth the price.‖ 4 The Eighth and Tenth
Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and
Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has
simply noted that the Court has been ―unclear‖ about the appropriate standard.
The lack of doctrinal coherence has also left an important form of speech
without adequate First Amendment protections.
My objective in this Article is to articulate a framework for reviewing
charitable solicitation regulation that better accounts for the important
democratic values of this kind of speech. This requires understanding the
relationship between charitable solicitation and related First Amendment
concepts. I begin by reviewing the state of three of these concepts—content
analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech—when the Court decided
Schaumburg in 1980. In Part III, I review the Court‘s charitable solicitation
decisions. Part IV proposes an alternative test to that constructed under the
1. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
2. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
3. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in
110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1997).
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Schaumburg-Munson-Riley trilogy. My normative approach accounts for the
speaker-based interests related to charitable solicitation and builds upon a
―civic conception of free speech‖ that better ensures ―broad communication
about matters of public concern‖ advanced both directly and indirectly
through charitable solicitation.5 I contend that a balancing of interests rooted
in a concern for democratic discourse offers a more principled and more
cogent review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome
formulations applied today.
II. CONTENT ANALYSIS, TIERED SCRUTINY, AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Content analysis 6 and tiered scrutiny7 emerged independently of one
another in First Amendment law. The latter originated in the equal protection
context: by the early 1970s, commentators had observed that the Court
applied strict scrutiny to classifications that were suspect or involved a
fundamental interest while subjecting all other statutes to a ―standard of
minimal rationality.‖8 Because speech was deemed to be a fundamental
liberty interest under the First Amendment, the Court evaluated regulations of
most forms of speech under strict scrutiny. 9
5. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19, 28 (2d ed. 1995).
6. Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral when justified without
reference to the content of speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral is not always readily discernible. See
Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and ContentNeutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 809 (2004) (―[T]he distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws is too amorphous to serve as a determinative test of
constitutionality.‖); see also Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis,
34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (the use of content distinction is ―both theoretically questionable and
difficult to apply‖); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 107 (1978) (―[S]ince content-neutral, like
content-based, restrictions may at times have a differential impact or reflect a latent government
hostility toward certain ideas, the differences between these two types of restrictions often seem to be
differences more of degree than of kind.‖).
7. See United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (strict scrutiny);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny).
8. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (―The Warren Court embraced
a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive ‗new‘ equal protection, with scrutiny
that was ‗strict‘ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential ‗old‘ equal protection
reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.‖).
9. The Court made an important distinction in 1942 when it clarified that categories of speech
were either protected or unprotected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
Regulations of speech in the latter category were of little constitutional concern. Id. (―[S]uch
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.‖); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (1st ed.
1978) (―From the dictum in Chaplinsky the Supreme Court had gradually derived what became
known as the two-level theory of the first amendment, recognizing speech at one level as fully
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As the Court assimilated tiered scrutiny into its First Amendment
doctrine, it limited its application of strict scrutiny to regulations that
discriminated based upon the content of speech. This distinction first
appeared in the 1972 decision Police Department of City of Chicago v.
Mosley, which involved a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing or
demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of any school but exempting
―the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.‖ 10 Mosley
challenged the ordinance on equal protection grounds, and the Court rejected
the City‘s distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. 11
Regulations based on content were ―never permitted‖12 and would be
subjected to a high degree of scrutiny. 13
Contemporaneously with Mosley, the Court reconsidered its two-fold
regime of strict and rational basis scrutiny. Writing of the 1971 Term that
included Mosley, Gerald Gunther suggested that there was ―mounting
discontent‖ with two-tiered scrutiny and that the Court was prepared to
intervene in some circumstances with something less than strict scrutiny. 14
Gunther presaged that an ―intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close
the wide gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the
minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the
level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.‖ 15
entitled to first amendment protection and relegating to a lower level speech so worthless as to be
beyond the constitutional ken.‖).
10. Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972). Stephen Gottlieb contends that
Mosley ―reinterpreted [past] cases in terms of the obligation of government to remain neutral with
respect to the content of speech.‖ Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of
Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 24 (1986).
11. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94.
12. Id. at 99. Noting that ―the equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with
First Amendment interests,‖ the Court concluded that ―[t]he central problem with Ch icago‘s
ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.‖ Id. at 95, 99.
13. Kenneth Karst has observed that Mosley marked the Court‘s first full acknowledgment that
a content-based regulation was particularly odious because it violated ―the principle of equal liberty
of expression . . . inherent in the first amendment.‖ Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 (1975). Karst contends that ―[t]he
absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal liberty of expression in Supreme Court
decisions before Mosley may be attributable to a belief that the principle is so obviously central
among first amendment values that it requires no explanation.‖ Id. at 29.
14. Gunther, supra note 8, at 12.
15. Id. at 24. Several years after Gunther‘s article, the Court began extending a lesser degree of
scrutiny toward speech regulations that it concluded were not based on content. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court noted that it had ―often
approved‖ time, place, and manner restrictions ―provided that they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so
doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.‖ 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added). The term ―content-neutral‖ also entered the Court‘s lexicon. See
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a ―content-neutral
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Gunther‘s prediction of an emerging intermediate scrutiny was consistent
with the adumbrations of the Court‘s 1968 decision in United States v.
O‟Brien.16 O‟Brien, a case involving ―expressive conduct,‖ announced a
previously unseen standard of review:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.17
Writing about O‟Brien in 1975, John Hart Ely commented: ―[T]he Court
is surely to be commended for here attempting something it attempts too
seldom, the statement of a coherent and applicable test.‖18 But Ely observed
that O‟Brien‘s language revealed an ambiguity in the Court‘s strict scrutiny
test.19 Prior to O‟Brien, strict scrutiny review upheld a speech regulation only
if there were no ―less restrictive means‖ available. 20 Ely noted that this phrase
could be either strongly or weakly construed. 21 Strongly construed, the test
would invalidate almost any regulation because, as Justice Blackmun
observed four years later, ―[a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he
could not come up with something a little less ‗drastic‘ or a little less
‗restrictive‘ in almost any situation.‖ 22 Weakly construed, some regulations
would survive review. 23 O‟Brien substituted the phrase ―no greater than is
time, place, and manner restriction‖); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (same).
16. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
17. Id. This new test was consistent with the jurisprudential developments in equal protection
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503–04
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971).
18. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975). Ely foreshadowed a
broad applicability of the new test, observing that O‟Brien‘s standard was ―not limited to cases
involving so-called ‗symbolic speech.‘‖ Id.
19. According to Ely, the fourth prong of O‟Brien‘s test ―involves a choice between different
conceptions of [the ‗no greater than is essential‘] standard, a choice made by reference to factors
neither O‟Brien nor any other Supreme Court decision has yet made explicit.‖ Id.
20. Id. at 1484–85.
21. Id.
22. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
23. Ely wrote that ―this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the gratuitous
inhibition of expression, requiring only that a prohibition not outrun the interest it is designed to
serve.‖ Ely, supra note 18, at 1485.
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essential‖ for ―less restrictive means‖ 24 and upheld the defendant‘s criminal
conviction for violating a speech regulation. 25 Ely concluded that the analysis
and result were consistent with the weak formulation of strict scrutiny. 26 He
suggested that this weak formulation ―turned out to be no protection at all,‖
and he equated O‟Brien‘s review to rational basis scrutiny. 27 Here, his
otherwise trenchant analysis was exaggerated. The plain language of O‟Brien
indicated something beyond minimal scrutiny. 28 The case signaled the
emergence of an intermediate standard of review that was less than strict
scrutiny but greater than rational basis review. 29
Although the Court initially failed to classify O‟Brien as an intermediate
scrutiny test, it tightened its strict scrutiny definition in two First Amendment
decisions issued the year after Ely‘s article, supplanting the settled ―less
restrictive means‖ with the previously unseen ―least restrictive means.‖30 The
slight language shift ensured that the Court‘s strict scrutiny test was no longer
vulnerable to the weak formulation that Ely had exposed.
24. See United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
25. Id.
26. ―Further language in the O‟Brien opinion, and the holding of the case, indicate that [the
weak formulation] is the strongest form of less restrictive alternative analysis in which, under the
circumstances, the Court was prepared to engage.‖ Ely, supra note 18, at 1485.
27. Id. at 1486 n.18.
28. In 1984, the Court characterized O‟Brien as ―little, if any, different from the [intermediate
scrutiny] standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.‖ Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–98
(1989).
29. A similar development was evolving more explicitly in the Court‘s equal protection
analysis. A 1977 Note in the Harvard Law Review observed that ―[m]any commentators ha[d] noted
the emergence from the Supreme Court of an intermediate standard of scrutiny in equal protection
analysis, more deferential than the ‗strict scrutiny‘ exercised in challenges to suspect classifications
and classifications impinging on fundamental rights, but more exacting than the ‗rational basis‘ test
traditionally applied to economic and social welfare legislation.‖ Note, Intermediate Standard of
Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177 (1977). Although this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection
analysis was strikingly similar to the new O‟Brien standard for expressive speech jurisprudence, the
Court had not yet linked the concepts when it decided Schaumburg.
30. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (―Though there is a vital need for government
efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least restrictive means for
fostering that end.‖); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (―[D]isclosure requirements—certainly
in most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist‖). Buckley and Elrod were the Court‘s earliest
uses of the phrase ―least restrictive means.‖ Three years later, in Illinois State Board of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, the Court asserted that it had previously ―required that States adopt the least
drastic means to achieve their ends.‖ 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979). The Court supported this somewhat
apocryphal claim by citing two previous decisions: Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974), and
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–33 (1968). Rhodes contained no discussion about the burden
that a regulation could place on a protected interest. Lubin noted that a ―legitimate state interest . . .
must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden . . . an . . . important
interest.‖ 415 U.S. at 716. Neither case supported the principle that strict scrutiny required the ―least
drastic means.‖
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Ely observed that O‟Brien‘s crucial inquiry was its second prong—
whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.31 A regulation that failed to satisfy this prong was not per se
unconstitutional, but the Court‘s analysis would be ―switched onto another
track.‖32 That other track was strict scrutiny. 33 The conclusion that a
regulation related to the suppression of free expression (i.e., a content-based
regulation) required strict scrutiny was the same conclusion that Mosley had
reached. 34 But Mosley had failed to distinguish O‟Brien‘s more relaxed test
from strict scrutiny. Ely clarified the distinction by inferring not only the
connection between content-based regulation and strict scrutiny but also its
converse: content-neutral regulations were subject to something less than
strict scrutiny. 35 The Court, however, had not yet adopted the term
―intermediate scrutiny,‖ and the litmus for content-neutrality had not yet
become whether a regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.36 Ely‘s analytical prescience about the link between contentneutrality and intermediate scrutiny likely went unrecognized because the
relevant descriptive terms were not yet embedded in the Court‘s vernacular.
The terminology, however, was close at hand. In 1978, Laurence Tribe
observed that ―[w]here government aims at the noncommunicative impact of
an act [i.e., when the regulation is not content-based], the correct result in any
particular case thus reflects some ‗balancing‘ of the competing interests.‖37
Several months later, Geoffrey Stone, in the first of three articles that tracked
the development of the Court‘s content analysis doctrine in the 1970s and the
1980s, explained that ―[g]overnmental restrictions of expression may be
divided into two general categories—content-neutral restrictions and contentbased restrictions.‖38 Stone observed that the Court subjected content-based
restrictions of ―fully protected‖ expression to ―a stringently speech-protective
set of standards‖ and upheld such regulations ―in only the most extraordinary
circumstances.‖39 Conversely, the Court reviewed content-neutral restrictions
with ―a balancing of first amendment interests against competing government
31. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
32. Id. Tribe uses the ―track‖ terminology in his analysis of communication and expression.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 580–688.
33. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
34. Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
35. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
36. The Court clarified the latter in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
37. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 581. Tribe traces the roots of the academic debate between
absolutist protection and balancing to the early 1960s. See id. at 582–83 n.19.
38. Stone, supra note 6, at 81. The other two articles are Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), and Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
39. Stone, supra note 6, at 82.
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concerns.‖40 Thus, only two years before the Court‘s landmark charitable
solicitation decision in Schaumburg, commentators had zeroed in on the
emergence of an intermediate scrutiny balancing test for content-neutral
regulations of protected speech.
One other emerging concept affected the context in which the Court
examined Schaumburg: commercial speech analysis, ―a notoriously unstable
and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.‖ 41 Since its 1942
decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court had viewed commercial
speech as unprotected.42 In the mid-1970s, the Court reversed this
classification in two decisions, Bigelow v. Virginia43 and Virginia Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.44 After Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, the Court protected commercial speech, but the degree of
that protection remained unclear because commercial speech was not ―wholly
undifferentiable from other forms‖ of speech. 45 As Justice Powell elaborated
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‟n:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment‘s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a
devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.46
Commercial speech, then, although within the realm of First Amendment
protection, was something less than fully protected speech. The distinction
created a conundrum. Under the old two-tiered scrutiny, the Court subjected
40. Id. at 81; see also Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 762 (1980) (Review of content-neutral regulation ―consists of a
middle-tier equal protection test, similar to that used in cases of discrimination on the basis of gender
or illegitimacy, coupled with a controlled balancing test.‖).
41. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(2000).
42. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (―[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising.‖), overruled by Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
44. 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976).
45. Id. at 771 n.24.
46. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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regulation of protected speech to strict scrutiny and regulation of unprotected
speech to rational basis scrutiny. With the advent of content analysis, the
Court applied a form of intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulation of
protected speech. But what about content-neutral regulation of commercial
speech? No longer unprotected, commercial speech merited something other
than rational basis scrutiny. But because commercial speech was not ―wholly
undifferentiable‖ from other forms of protected speech, it did not warrant the
same degree of protection as these other forms.
III. THE CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CASES
The appearance of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and a new
understanding to commercial speech during the 1970s provided the context in
which the Court formulated its approach to charitable solicitation in
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. I now turn to these cases.
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
Schaumburg addressed a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door or
on-street solicitation by an organization that did not use at least 75% of
donations for ―charitable purposes.‖47 The Village of Schaumburg offered
three justifications for its regulation: policing fraud, protecting public safety
and protecting residential privacy.48 The Court concluded that the ―legitimate
interest‖ in preventing fraud ―[could] be better served by measures less
intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation,‖ 49 and found no ―substantial
relationship‖ between the 75% requirement and the protection of public safety
or residential privacy. 50 The village‘s interests were thus only ―peripherally
promoted‖ by the limitation and ―could be sufficiently served by measures
less destructive of First Amendment interests.‖51 Although the Court never
47. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 622–23 (1980). The
ordinance regulated ―peddlers and solicitors,‖ who were defined as ―any persons who, going from
place to place without appointment, offer goods or services for sale or take orders for future delivery
of goods or services.‖ Id. at 622 n.1. The Court devoted the bulk of its analysis to the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine and held that the Village‘s ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id. at 635. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine traces its roots to Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE
L.J. 853, 863 (1991). The doctrine permits someone whose conduct may be legitimately proscribed
to challenge the proscription as it applies to others. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; see Fallon, supra,
at 863–67. Because overbreadth is an ―ancillary‖ doctrine that comports with the Court‘s more
substantive doctrines like content analysis, see id. at 866–67 (citing David S. Bogen, First
Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 681 (1978)), Schaumburg‘s principles are
applicable outside the overbreadth context.
48. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636, 638.
49. Id. at 637.
50. Id. at 638.
51. Id. at 636.
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synthesized these observations in Schaumburg, its underlying test might be
formulated as follows:
A direct and substantial regulation of door-to-door or onstreet charitable solicitation will be sustained if it serves
sufficiently strong, subordinating interests by means of
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms.52
Four months after Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
Blackmun, asserted in his dissent in Carey v. Brown that Schaumburg had
articulated a content-neutral intermediate scrutiny test.53 At least one lower
court reached the same interpretation that year,54 as did Professor Stone in an
article published three years later.55
B. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
Four years after Schaumburg, the Court revisited restrictions on charitable
solicitation in Munson.56 The Maryland statute at issue in Munson, like the
Schaumburg ordinance, limited the percentage of charitable solicitations that
charities could spend on fundraising costs.57 The statute, however, covered
any ―fund-raising activity‖ rather than simply door-to-door and on-street
solicitation.58 The plaintiff, a professional charitable solicitor, asserted that
the statute violated his rights to free speech and assembly.59
52. This phrasing is derived from Stone‘s characterization of Schaumburg‘s test. See Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50.
53. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 476–77 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Schaumburg for the proposition that the Court ―has upheld state authority to restrict the time, place,
and manner of speech, if those regulations ‗protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression‘ and are narrowly tailored, limiting the restrictions to those reasonably
necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest‖).
54. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App. 1981)
(citing Schaumburg for the notion that ―[r]easonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of the
exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights will be upheld if they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech and are narrowly drawn, limiting the restrictions to
those necessary to protect significant governmental interests‖).
55. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 245 (intimating that
the ordinance in Schaumburg was a content-neutral, speaker-based restriction).
56. Sec‘y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
57. Id. at 950. Unlike the Schaumburg ordinance, the Maryland statute included a discretionary
provision under which the Secretary of State could license a charity whose fundraising expenditures
exceeded the statutory cap if enforcing the cap would ―effectively prevent the charitable organization
from raising contributions.‖ Id. at 962.
58. Id. at 950 n.2. In addition to door-to-door solicitation, any ―fund-raising activity‖
presumably encompasses solicitation ranging from telemarketing to newspaper advertisements. At
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Munson relied heavily on Schaumburg. Justice Blackmun explained for
the Court that the government restriction in Schaumburg had not been ―a
precisely tailored means‖ and had borne ―no necessary connection‖ to the
Village‘s asserted interests.60
Because these phrases, absent from
Schaumburg, were not strict scrutiny terms, it appeared that Munson was
cryptically endorsing Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test. But
Munson then cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny proposition that certain
statutes would be invalidated if they ―[did] not employ means narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.‖61 Schaumburg had
asserted that a restriction had to be ―narrowly drawn‖62 but had never used the
strict scrutiny phrase ―narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.‖ Munson thus recharacterized Schaumburg‘s test as akin to strict
scrutiny,63 approximating the following:
A direct and substantial regulation of charitable solicitation
will be sustained if it furthers a compelling governmental
interest, and if the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest and does not unnecessarily interfere with First
Amendment freedoms. 64
Following Munson, a federal district judge, 65 a federal appellate judge, 66
and the Supreme Court of Maine67 cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny
principle that a regulation must be the ―least restrictive means‖ available to
accomplish a legislative purpose, a strict scrutiny interpretation that exceeded
even Munson‘s recharacterization of Schaumburg. Conversely, Stone, in an

least one of the governmental interests in Schaumburg, protecting public safety, fails to justify
restrictions on these other forms of fundraising.
59. Id. at 950, 952.
60. Id. at 961.
61. Id. at 965 n.13.
62. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).
63. Like Schaumburg, Munson never addressed whether the Maryland regulation was contentneutral or content-based.
64. This formulation approximates the standards articulated or implied by Munson.
65. See Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894, 897 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Schaumburg for
the principle that even a compelling interest ―must be drawn with the least restriction on First
Amendment freedoms‖).
66. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Schaumburg in the context of strict scrutiny for the principle that a
state ―must demonstrate that [a] regulation is ‗the least restrictive means available that would
accomplish the legislative purpose‘‖).
67. See State v. Me. State Troopers Ass‘n, 491 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1985) (citing Schaumburg
for the principle that a law ―must be narrowly drawn so that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving the compelling government interest‖).
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oft-cited article on content analysis, adhered to his earlier assessment that
Schaumburg articulated an intermediate scrutiny test for a content-neutral
regulation.68 The confusion stemming from the convergence of tiered scrutiny
and content analysis in evaluation of charitable solicitation regulation was
becoming evident.
C. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.
Four years after Munson, the Court examined three provisions in the
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, which directly regulated
professional charitable solicitors.69 Turning first to a requirement that the
percentage of contributions retained by professional charitable solicitors be
―reasonable,‖ Justice Brennan began by reviewing Schaumburg and
Munson.70 Justice Brennan noted that Munson had applied ―exacting First
Amendment scrutiny,‖71 and concluded that Schaumburg and Munson ―teach
that the solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech, and that
using percentages to decide the legality of the fundraiser‘s fee is not narrowly
tailored to the State‘s interest in preventing fraud.‖72 The Court held that the
reasonable fee provision was unconstitutional under this standard. 73
Addressing next a requirement in the statute that professional solicitors
make certain disclosures, Justice Brennan abruptly concluded that the
provision was a content-based regulation because ―[m]andating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the
speech.‖74 This perfunctory conclusion was the first time that the Court had
explicitly applied content analysis to a charitable solicitation regulation.
Justice Brennan then noted that ―North Carolina‘s content-based regulation
[was] subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.‖75

68. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50. Stone considered
Schaumburg to correspond to a test of intermediate scrutiny under which ―the Court takes seriously
the inquiries into the substantiality of the governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives.‖ Id. at 52. Under this intermediate standard of review, ―the government cannot satisfy
the less restrictive alternative requirement merely by demonstrating that less restrictive measures
would serve its ends ‗less effectively‘ than the challenged regulation. Rather, to withstand
intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove that its use of a less restrictive alternative would
seriously undermine substantial governmental interests.‖ Id. at 53.
69. Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). Unlike the regulations in
Schaumburg and Munson, the North Carolina statute was explicitly limited to professional solicitors.
Id. at 784 n.2.
70. Id. at 787–89.
71. Id. at 789.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 795.
75. Id. at 798.
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The Court concluded that the disclosure provision was unconstitutional
because the means chosen to accomplish the State‘s interest in informing
donors were ―unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.‖76 Justice
Brennan‘s choice of wording here is curiously vague. When Riley was
decided in 1988, it was settled doctrine that courts applied strict scrutiny to a
content-based regulation of protected speech. 77 But rather than follow this
standard, Justice Brennan hedged with the phrase ―exacting scrutiny‖ and
avoided the familiar terms of ―compelling interest‖ and ―least restrictive
means.‖78 The Court was either deliberately carving out a unique standard of
review for content-based regulation of charitable solicitation or unnecessarily
perpetuating ambiguity and imprecision. Riley made clear, however, that
whatever exacting scrutiny meant, it was the test that the Court had used in
Munson, and by implication, in Schaumburg.79
Riley added an additional wrinkle in its analysis of the disclosure
provision. Having concluded that ―[m]andating speech that a speaker would
not otherwise make‖ rendered a regulation content-based, 80 Riley appeared to
have announced that any disclosure provision would be subjected to exacting
scrutiny. But Justice Brennan then cited two examples of compelled
disclosures that would be constitutionally permissible—requiring financial
disclosure reports81 and requiring that a professional solicitor disclose his or

76. Id. The Court opined that ―[i]n contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly
burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its alleged donor misperception, more benign and
narrowly tailored options are available.‖ Id. at 800.
77. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 413, 449–50 (1993) (―The period of the early 1980‘s [sic] marked the beginning of the
relatively consistent practices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between
content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.‖).
78. Although the majority in Riley never used the term strict scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist‘s
dissent classified the majority‘s test as such. Riley, 487 U.S. at 810–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(―The Court concludes, after a lengthy discussion of the constitutionality of ‗compelled statements,‘
that strict scrutiny should be applied and that the statute does not survive that scrutiny.‖).
79. Compare id. at 789 (The Court used ―exacting scrutiny‖ in Munson.) with id. at 798 (North
Carolina‘s content-based regulation is subject to ―exacting First Amendment scrutiny.‖).
80. Id. at 795.
81. Id. at 788. Riley noted that Schaumburg had observed that the government would have
been free to require charities to file financial disclosure reports. Id. Leslie Espinoza asserts that
Schaumburg took
an absolutist first amendment approach to fund-raising disclosure statutes,
leaving no room for the Court to balance the potentially different regulatory
interests in charitable solicitation as opposed to charitable advocacy. Backed
into a corner, the Court issued an internally contradictory opinion on disclosure
and left little opportunity for states to develop appropriate regulation.
Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable
Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 612 (1991).
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her professional status.82 The latter exception drew disagreement from Justice
Scalia, who observed that it
represent[ed] a departure from our traditional understanding,
embodied in the First Amendment, that where the
dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer to assume that
the people are smart enough to get the information they need
than to assume that the government is wise or impartial
enough to make the judgment for them. 83
D. Revisiting Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley
Not surprisingly, the federal appellate courts have split in their
interpretations of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. The Eighth84 and Tenth85
Circuits have concluded that Schaumburg established a test of intermediate
scrutiny for a content-neutral regulation. Conversely, the Third86 and
Eleventh87 Circuits have cited Schaumburg for the modern strict scrutiny test.
The Fourth Circuit has recently announced that ―[i]t is unclear‖ whether the
Court‘s standard amounts to strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. 88 The
confusion is equally apparent in the trial courts.89

82. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11.
83. Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005) (―Although
the Supreme Court has not specified whether the Schaumburg test is an intermediate scrutiny review
of a content-neutral regulation, we have interpreted it as such.‖) (citing Pryor, 258 F.3d at 851); Nat‘l
Fed. of the Blind of Ark., Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2001) (comparing
Schaumburg to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). But see Video Software
Dealers Ass‘n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that Sable Commc‘n of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), quoted Schaumburg as part of its strict scrutiny formulation).
85. See Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Schaumburg for intermediate scrutiny test of content-neutral regulation).
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schaumburg for the
proposition that ―[a]s in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the government must
establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, and that it
seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least restrictive of protected speech‖) vacated by
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315,
344 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing Schaumburg as having struck down ―a content-based restriction
on door-to-door solicitation because restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored‖).
87. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1542
n.34 (11th Cir. 1993) (―We believe the same can be said with respect to Village of Schaumburg and
the other strict scrutiny cases relied upon by the city.‖ (citation omitted)).
88. Nat‘l Fed. of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005). Curiously, the court
concluded that ―[r]egardless of the label, the substance of the test is clear.‖ Id. Cf. Famine Relief
Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 754 (4th Cir. 1990); Telco Commc‘n, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has cited Schaumburg in addressing charitable
solicitation regulation but has not explicitly characterized the case under content analysis or tiered
scrutiny. See Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 1993) (Schaumburg and other
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I turn now to the possible reasons for the Court‘s confusing guidance in its
charitable solicitation cases. Schaumburg‘s difficulties begin with its failure
to address content analysis and tiered scrutiny, even though both concepts
were squarely before the Court. The Village of Schaumburg asserted in its
reply brief that its ordinance should not face strict scrutiny because it was
―[neutral] on its face and neutral in its administration.‖90 The Village cited
Virginia Board of Pharmacy for the proposition that ―[r]estrictions on the
time, place or manner of expression are permissible provided that ‗they are
imposed without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.‘‖ 91
Conversely, the nonprofit group Citizens for a Better Environment contended
that ―[o]nly a narrowly-drawn ordinance that serves a compelling state interest
with narrow specificity and is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment
can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction
on freedom of speech.‖92 In essence, then, the parties asked the Court to
decide whether the relevant standard of review was strict or intermediate
scrutiny. But rather than employing the standards briefed by the parties, the
Court ignored content analysis altogether and sidestepped the debate over
whether strict scrutiny was warranted.
The Court‘s lack of clarity may be partially attributable to the views about
tiered scrutiny held by the Justices central to the development of its approach
to charitable solicitation. Four Justices were in the majorities of all three
major cases: Justice White (the author of Schaumburg), Justice Blackmun
(who authored Munson), Justice Brennan (who authored Riley), and Justice

cases hold that solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech, and ―restrictions on
solicitation in traditional public forums must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government
interest.‖).
89. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1296 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (citing Schaumburg as intermediate scrutiny test); Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287
F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029, 1030 (D.N.D. 2003) (relying on Schaumburg and asserting both that ―[t]he
statute does not have to be the least restrictive means of regulation‖ and that the restriction ―must
withstand strict scrutiny‖); Tenn. Law Enforcement Youth Found., Inc. v. Millsaps, No. 89-2762-G,
1991 WL 523878, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 1991) (citing Schaumburg as strict scrutiny test).
90. Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 6, Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S.
620 (1980) (No. 78-1335).
91. Id. at 12 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976)).
92. Respondents‘ Brief at 14, Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (No. 78-1335) (internal quotations
omitted). The Village countered that ―[t]he cases cited by the respondents in their brief simply d o
not lend any credence to the concept that an ordinance regulating the solicitation of funds is subject
to strict scrutiny.‖ Petitioner‘s Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 10.
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Marshall.93 Two years before Schaumburg, these same four Justices had
expressed their reservations about tiered scrutiny in the landmark affirmative
action case Regents of University of California v. Bakke.94 In their joint
partial concurrence, the Justices found it ―necessary to define with precision
the meaning of that inexact term, ‗strict scrutiny.‘‖ 95 They contended that ―a
government practice or statute which restricts ‗fundamental rights‘ or which
contains ‗suspect classifications‘ is to be subjected to ‗strict scrutiny‘ and can
be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even
then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.‖ 96 But wary of
endorsing tiered scrutiny, the Justices made clear that ―[w]e do not pause to
debate whether our cases establish a ‗two-tier‘ analysis, a ‗sliding scale‘
analysis, or something else altogether‖ because ―[i]t is enough for present
purposes that strict scrutiny is applied at least in some cases.‖97
The following year, Justice Blackmun distanced himself from his
qualified recognition of strict scrutiny in Bakke. Concurring in Illinois State
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,98 Justice Blackmun lamented
the Court‘s ongoing efforts to clarify strict scrutiny:
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a
―compelling state interest‖ is. . . . And, for me, ―least drastic
means‖ is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the
Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative
indeed if he could not come up with something a little less

93. Schaumburg was an 8-1 decision in 1980, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting. Justice
O‘Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981. Munson was decided in 1984 by a 5-4 margin, with
Justice Stevens concurring and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and O‘Connor joining
Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Justice Burger‘s departure in 1986 resulted in Justice Rehnquist‘s
elevation to Chief Justice and Justice Scalia‘s introduction to the Court. The following year, Justice
Kennedy replaced Justice Powell. In 1988, Riley was a more fractured decision with Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy fully joining Justice Brennan‘s majority opinion. Although
Justice Stevens joined the majority in Schaumburg and Munson and most of the Court‘s opinion in
Riley, his concurrence in Munson distinguishes him from the other four Justices in all three
majorities.
94. 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 357 n.30. Two months prior to Bakke, Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, had derided any attempt by the Court to recalculate a legislative balancing of interests. See
First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (―What is
inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to the proper balance for that of
Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation reasonably designed to further First
Amendment interests in the context of the political arena where the expertise of legislators is at its
peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.‖).
98. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).

2009]

MAKING SENSE OF SCHAUMBURG

567

―drastic‖ or a little less ―restrictive‖ in almost any situation,
and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.
This is reminiscent of the Court‘s indulgence, a few decades
ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a
means of nullification.
I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these phrases
are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis. They
are too convenient and result oriented, and I must endeavor to
disassociate myself from them. 99
Justice Blackmun, at least, had serious reservations about the application of
strict scrutiny to constitutional matters.
Notwithstanding the apparent hesitancy of some members of the Court to
endorse tiered scrutiny, much of the confusion in Schaumburg was likely
genuine rather than obscurantist. The Court had not yet settled on a consistent
application of either content analysis or tiered scrutiny in First Amendment
cases when it decided Schaumburg, and the analytical difficulties posed by
these emerging concepts were compounded by the Court‘s newfound
acceptance of commercial speech. Virginia Board of Pharmacy announced
that commercial speech would receive some kind of protection, ostensibly
something more than the rational basis scrutiny that the Court had previously
applied to commercial speech regulation.100 But Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass‟n made clear that commercial speech would not receive the same
protection as other protected speech. 101 Schaumburg introduced another
complexity by insisting that charitable solicitation was not simply commercial
speech because it ―[did] more than inform private economic decisions and
[was] not primarily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services.‖ 102 But nor was there any
indication that charitable solicitation was core political speech. Taken
together, Schaumburg and the commercial speech cases meant that
commercial speech received something more than rational basis scrutiny and
charitable solicitation received something more than the protection afforded
commercial speech but less than that given to core political speech. 103 This
hierarchy proved difficult to keep straight.
99. Id. at 188–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976).
101. 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978).
102. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
103. The confusion caused by these concepts was evident in footnote 7 of the Court‘s opinion
in Schaumburg, which noted that
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The emerging commercial speech doctrine also complicated content
analysis. By the time the Court decided Schaumburg, it was clear that a
content-based restriction of protected speech received strict scrutiny and a
content-neutral restriction received something less than strict scrutiny. But
the Court‘s uncertainty of how to address commercial speech and charitable
solicitation left unclear what level of scrutiny would be applied to contentneutral regulations of those forms of speech. When Schaumburg signaled that
charitable solicitation was ―fully protected speech,‖ it did so to distinguish
charitable solicitation from commercial solicitation. 104 It did not mean that
regulation of charitable solicitation would always be subject to strict scrutiny
because content analysis required varied levels of scrutiny for all forms of
protected speech, even core political speech. 105 Schaumburg‘s avoidance of
content analysis left unclear whether charitable solicitation always merited the
same degree of protection as other core speech, or whether, like commercial
speech, it sometimes fell into an ambiguous middle category. 106

[t]o the extent that any of the Court‘s past decisions . . . hold or indicate that
commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections, those
decisions, to that extent, are no longer good law. For the purposes of applying
the overbreadth doctrine, however, it remains relevant to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial speech.
Id. at 632 n.7 (citations omitted). The Court did not explain why distinguishing between commercial
and noncommercial speech remained relevant in the context of the overbreadth doctrine. Three
years earlier, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court had cryptically asserted that ―the justification
for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial
context.‖ 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). The only support the Court offered for this assertion was that
―[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.‖ Id. at 381.
104. The distinction was by no means nontrivial. Tribe has highlighted the importance of
―maintaining some residual distinctions between commercial and ideological expression on the
ground that the former is valued only for the ‗facts‘ it conveys while the latter ‗is integrally related to
the exposition of thought—thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man.‘‖
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 655 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Writing two years prior to Schaumburg, Tribe
cautioned that distinguishing between commercial speech and other kinds of speech ―may be needed
if constitutional doctrine is to recognize the ‗commonsense differences between speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.‘‖ Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 771 n.24). Ten years later, in the second edition of his treatise, Tribe lamented that ―the
Court has repeatedly struggled with defining the differences between commercial and noncommercial speech, notwithstanding its offhand announcement that the difference between the two is
based on ‗commonsense.‘‖ LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894 (2d ed.
1988).
105. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980) (―The ‗absolutely protected‘
character of the message cannot insulate [all] forms of expression from regulation: context—the
threat the particular expressive event poses—obviously is relevant and sometimes will be
dispositive.‖).
106. Cf. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1159 (15th ed.
2004) (―[C]ommercial speech continues to stand as the lone formal exception to the two-level
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Unable or unwilling to synthesize the concepts before it, the Court failed
to articulate a workable framework in Schaumburg. Four years later, the
Court‘s significant reliance on Schaumburg in Munson prevented it from
drawing upon more cogent developments elsewhere in its First Amendment
jurisprudence. This tunnel vision is particularly evident when Munson is
compared to another First Amendment case decided just forty-two days
earlier, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 107 Vincent
involved a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on
public property.108 Supporters of a local political candidate contracted with a
political sign service company to create and post campaign signs.109 After the
signs were duly removed by the City, the supporters and the sign company
sought an injunction. 110 The Court determined that the ordinance was neutral
as to viewpoint and then cited O‟Brien for ―the appropriate framework for
reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation.‖111 The Court concluded that the
Los Angeles ordinance withstood O‟Brien‘s test and left open adequate
alternative means of communication. 112 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, explaining that:
The Court‘s first task is to determine whether the ordinance is
aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is,
whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression
[citing Consolidated Edison and Mosley]. If the restriction is
content-neutral, the court‘s task is to determine (1) whether
the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is
substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech
is no greater than is essential to further that objective. Unless
both conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated. 113
Disagreeing with the Court‘s intimation that the Los Angeles ordinance left
open ample means of communication like handbill distribution, 114 Justice
Brennan wrote that:

approach to speech set forth in Chaplinsky . . . . [I]t enjoys First Amendment protection, but not as
much First Amendment protection as other speech.‖).
107. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
108. Id. at 791.
109. Id. at 792.
110. Id. at 793.
111. Id. at 804.
112. Id. at 812.
113. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 812.
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The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by
passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically
read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must
handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be
spent distributing them. The average cost of communicating
by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the
average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason,
signs posted on public property are doubtless ―essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people,‖115 and their
prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of
communication. Because the City has completely banned the
use of this particular medium of communication, and because,
given the circumstances, there are no equivalent alternative
media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must
examine with particular care the justifications that the City
proffers for its ban.116
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun thus highlighted three important
factors in analyzing a speech restriction: (1) the need to begin with content
analysis; (2) the appropriate test for reviewing a content-neutral regulation;
and (3) the importance of considering the potentially disparate effects of a
regulation on ―the poorly financed causes of little people.‖117 One month
later, these same three Justices joined the narrow majority in Munson in an
opinion authored by Justice Blackmun. Yet none of the doctrinal or equitable
considerations from the Vincent dissent surfaced in Munson.118 Four years
later, Riley alluded to disparate effects and acknowledged the need for
content-analysis but did little else to clarify the ambiguities in Schaumburg
and Munson.
E. Subsequent Cases
Less than a year after Riley, the Court issued its decision in Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, striking down under strict
scrutiny review a ban on ―dial-a-porn‖ telephone messages that were indecent
but not obscene. 119 Sable is interesting in the present context not for its
substantive analysis but for its formulation of strict scrutiny. Justice White
observed that:

115. Justice Brennan quoted Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (invalidating
a city ordinance that restricted door-to-door distributions of circulars).
116. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 820–21.
118. See Sec‘y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
119. Sable Commc‘ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
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The Government may . . . regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means
to further the articulated interest. . . . [T]o withstand
constitutional scrutiny, ―it must do so by narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms.‖ [citing Schaumburg]. It is not enough to show
that the Government‘s ends are compelling; the means
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends. 120
Because Justice White had authored Schaumburg, his citation to that case as
part of his strict scrutiny analysis in Sable added further support to the view
that Riley‘s ―exacting scrutiny‖ (derived from Schaumburg) was actually strict
scrutiny.
The Court‘s only substantive post-Riley discussion of Schaumburg‘s
charitable solicitation principles came one year after Sable in United States v.
Kokinda.121 Kokinda involved a challenge to a Postal Service regulation that
permitted charitable advocacy but not charitable solicitation.122 A plurality of
the Court began its analysis by citing Schaumburg and Riley for the
proposition that ―[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the
First Amendment.‖123 The plurality continued that ―[u]nder our First
Amendment jurisprudence, we must determine the level of scrutiny that
applies to the regulation of protected speech at issue.‖124 Applying forum

120. Id. at 126.
121. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). Other than Sable and Kokinda, the Court has cited Schaumburg only
seven times since Riley: Davenport v. Washington Education Ass‟n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (2007)
(citing Schaumburg for overbreadth doctrine); McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S.
93, 140 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (overbreadth doctrine); Illinois ex rel.
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611 (2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 163 (2002) (citing Schaumburg for
principle that ―our cases involving nonreligious speech‖ show that ―the Jehovah‘s Witnesses are not
the only ‗little people‘ who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village‘s‖); International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1992); and Massachusetts v.
Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (overbreadth doctrine). Of these, only Madigan discusses
Schaumburg in detail (and it leaves unaltered the Court‘s approach to charitable solicitation). 538
U.S. at 612–17. Madigan involved a fraud prosecution of a professional charitable fundraiser. Id. at
617. The Court made clear that its ―opinions in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley took care to leave a
corridor open for fraud actions to guard the public against false or misleading charitable
solicitations.‖ Id.
122. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722–23.
123. Id. at 725.
124. Id.
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analysis125 (which had not been at issue in Schaumburg, Munson, or Riley)
and content analysis, the plurality concluded that the content-neutral Postal
Service regulation governed a nonpublic forum and upheld the
constitutionality of the regulation under rational basis scrutiny.126
Although the Justices disagreed on the application of forum analysis, 127
Kokinda is most interesting for its parsing of solicitation and advocacy.
Joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality approved of the regulation‘s contentneutral distinction ―because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal
Service‘s business.‖128 In Schaumburg, the Court appeared to have foreclosed
such an easy separation of solicitation and advocacy, having pronounced that
―solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views
on economic, political, or social issues.‖129 Kokinda‘s distinction between
solicitation and advocacy is also tenuous because it appears to discriminate
based on content. Mosley had indicated that regulations making subject
matter distinctions were content-based, a view that the Court reinforced five
months after Schaumburg in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public
Service Commission of New York.130 In light of these cases, the Kokinda
plurality‘s reasoning is questionable. It is unlikely, for example, that a
regulation excluding religious advocacy would have been subjected to rational
125. See Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–03 (1974).
126. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732–33.
127. See, e.g., id. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion). The issue of content analysis provoked an extended
exchange between the plurality and the dissent. See id. at 733–36; id. at 753–54, 760 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
129. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
130. 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (―[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.‖). Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens questioned this assertion, arguing that
every lawyer who has read . . . our cases upholding various restrictions on
speech with specific reference to subject matter must recognize the hyperbole in
[Mosley‘s] dictum: ‗But, above all else, the First Amendment means that the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.‘
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Stone‘s 1978 article intimated that subject
matter restrictions were in some ―intermediate position‖ between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions and might be ―properly subject to a more variable sort of analysis.‖ Stone, supra note 6,
at 100; see id. at 83. More recently, the Court has been less than clear about subject matter
distinctions. Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (―Regulation of the subject matter
of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of
content-based regulation‖) with id. at 724 (A regulation that distinguishes between speech activities
likely to have the consequences against which it seeks to protect and speech activities unlikely to
have those consequences ―cannot be struck down for failure to maintain ‗content neutrality.‘‖).
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basis scrutiny simply because the Postal Service believed that religious
advocacy was more disruptive than other forms of advocacy.
IV. A NEW TEST FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
I have argued above that the Court‘s failure to incorporate the concepts of
content analysis and tiered scrutiny in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley and
the ambiguous relationship between charitable solicitation and commercial
speech have produced an ill-defined test for reviewing charitable solicitation
regulation. The Court exacerbated these problems with its decisions in Sable
and Kokinda, which modified its approach to charitable solicitation with the
seemingly contradictory suggestions that: (1) Schaumburg had applied strict
scrutiny to a regulation governing charitable solicitation; and (2) charitable
solicitation was less protected than Schaumburg had implied. 131
The best way to bring a more coherent approach to judicial review of
charitable solicitation regulation is to reconcile Schaumburg with current
understandings of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech.
In doing so, we should also take care to recognize the value of charitable
solicitation in a democratic polity, the kind of normative concern that can too
easily be lost in rigid application of doctrinal formulas. With these doctrinal
and normative concerns in mind, I argue for a more flexible approach to
charitable solicitation regulation rooted in a balancing of interests. I turn now
to the project of constructing that approach.
A. The First Amendment Value of Charitable Solicitation
I base my approach to charitable solicitation regulation on a ―civic
conception of free speech‖ that pays particular attention to forms of speech
that advance self-governance and democratic discourse. 132 From this
framework, I suggest that regulation of charitable solicitation should be
carefully scrutinized for three reasons: (1) the link between charitable
solicitation and advocacy; (2) the inequalities among different kinds of
charitable organizations; and (3) the disparate effects of content-neutral
regulation on smaller and less popular charitable organizations.

131. One way to reconcile these two developments is to characterize Schaumburg as a strict
scrutiny test of a content-based regulation, which would mean that a content-neutral regulation like
that at issue in Kokinda would be subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny. Schaumburg‘s lack of any
content analysis makes this characterization difficult to sustain.
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 28. Sunstein links this civic conception to Justice Louis
Brandeis‘s famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Sunstein describes Justice Brandeis‘s theory as rooted in ―classical republican thought,
with its emphasis on political virtue, on public-spiritedness, on public deliberation, and on the
relationship between character and citizenship.‖ SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 27.
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1. Solicitation and Advocacy
One of the challenges of a civic conception of the First Amendment is
brought to light when the government regulates speech in order to protect the
privacy interests of an unwilling listener. 133 Two seemingly incommensurable
interests—speech and privacy—are pitted against each other, and we must
consider what factors should be considered in striking an appropriate balance
between these interests. Settled doctrine points to the location in which the
speech occurs as one factor to consider.134 A more civic-minded approach
might also consider the content of the speech—the degree to which the speech
contributes to the democratic project. But a civic approach goes beyond even
this instrumental value. As Robert Post has suggested:
To include speech within public discourse is to signify that it
is constitutionally valued not merely for the contribution it
may make to public discussion, but also, intrinsically, for the
engagement it represents in the public life of a nation. A
democracy cannot flourish unless its citizens actively
participate in the formation of its public opinion. Such
participation is ―precious‖ and to be encouraged for its own
sake. 135
The civic importance of charitable solicitation stems partly from the link
between solicitation and advocacy. Even the act of solicitation can itself be a
form of advocacy. In Schaumburg, the Court stated that ―solicitation is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic,
political, or social issues, and . . . without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease.‖ 136 Solicitation is also linked to
133. The privacy interests of an individual were famously advanced by Justice Brandeis and his
law partner, Sam Warren. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (defining privacy as the right ―to be let alone‖).
134. For example, the Court has observed that the government‘s interest ―in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society,‖ and that ―[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener.‖ Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
135. Post, supra note 41, at 20. Post contends that the Court‘s charitable solicitation cases hold
―that charitable solicitations are part of public discourse rather than commercial speech.‖ Id. at 20
n.86.
136. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see
also Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (criticizing the state‘s
assumption that ―the charity derive[d] no benefit from funds collected but not turned over to it‖
because ―where the solicitation is combined with the advocacy and dissemination of information, the
charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself‖). The Court provided an
example of an organization whose advocacy interests are directly advanced by solicitation in Illinois
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advocacy because solicitation may fund speech undertaken on a separate
occasion. Justice Scalia alluded to this in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission: ―an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech
itself.‖137
These observations hold not only for charitable solicitation but also for
other forms of solicitation, including commercial solicitation and
panhandling. Is there a principled distinction between these latter forms of
solicitation—neither of which receives elevated First Amendment
protection—and nonfraudulent charitable solicitation?138 In Young v. New
York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit suggested that panhandling
failed to implicate core First Amendment values:
The only message that we are able to [discern] as common to
all acts of begging is that beggars want to exact money from
those whom they accost. While we acknowledge that
[subway] passengers generally understand this generic
message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment. We certainly do not
consider it as a ―means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.‖139
The Supreme Court expressed a similar view about commercial speech in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‟n, observing that commercial speech was
afforded ―a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values.‖ 140
These distinctions are not impervious to challenge. Young was written
over a vigorous dissent from Judge Meskill, who noted that the panhandler
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 622 n.11 (2003) (―Telephone
solicitors retained by [Mothers Against Drunk Driving] ‗reach millions of people a year, and each
call educates the public about the tragedy of drunk driving, provides statistics and asks the customer
to always designate a sober driver.‘‖).
137. 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia cited Schaumburg and several other cases to support his contention. See also TRIBE, supra
note 104, at 829–30 (―Solicitation of contributions, wherever it takes place‖ is an activity that has
―historically been recognized as inextricably intertwined with speech or petition‖ and its regulation
―must therefore be assessed with particular sensitivity to the possible constriction of that breathing
space which freedom of speech requires in the society contemplated by the first amendment.‖);
Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 45 (―Central to any meaningful right of speech are the resources necessary
to exercise the right.‖).
138. The state can always regulate fraudulent charitable solicitation. See Madigan, 538 U.S. at
612 (―Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected
speech.‖).
139. 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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plaintiffs had stated in affidavits that ―they often speak with potential donors
about subjects such as the problems of the homeless and poor, the perceived
inefficiency of the social service system in New York and the dangerous
nature of the public shelters in which they sometimes sleep.‖141 Jed
Rubenfeld has similarly posited that begging is political speech ―from a
certain, perfectly plausible point of view sounding in political theory,
sociology, and so on.‖142 But Sunstein offers a different perspective:
[I]t is plausible to think that almost all speech is political in
the sense that it relates in some way to the existing social and
political structure. Commercial speech and obscenity are
examples. But if some people understand the speech in
question to be political, it cannot follow that the speech
qualifies as such for constitutional purposes, without treating
almost all speech as political.143
Elsewhere, Sunstein observes that the absence of constitutional protection for
some forms of speech ―owes at least something to the common-sense
judgment that different values are placed on different categories of speech.‖144
Although my contention that there is a principled distinction between
charitable and other forms of solicitation is contestable, it is no less plausible
than any line-drawing short of absolutism. 145 Moreover, my distinction tracks
similar demarcations made elsewhere, notably, in the federal tax code, which

141. Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment‟s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 801 (2001); see
also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to
Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 899 (1991) (―The beggar may describe in her plea why she has been
forced to beg, and the begging may lead to a discussion of larger issues. But even if the beggar
conveys nothing more than that she wants the listener to give her money, this information contributes
to the collective search for truth.‖).
143. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 132.
144. Id. at 125.
145. Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that the government could abrogate the right of free
speech ―in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or
moral.‖ Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis
provides a partial answer as to when the protection of the state might justify a restraint on speech:
The evil should be ―so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an
emergency can justify repression.‖ Id. at 377. This, of course, only bounds the indeterminacy; it
does not eliminate it. (What is an emergency? Who decides imminence? What constitutes a
falsehood, and by whose standards?) Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 149 (―There is no way to
operate a system of free expression without drawing lines.‖).
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extends favorable benefits to many charitable organizations but not to
commercial entities or beggars.146
2. The Distinctions Within Charitable Solicitation
As a practical matter, charities compete for limited financial resources
with unequal ability. As the umbrella organization Independent Sector argued
in its amicus brief in Riley: ―[s]olicitations and communications about the
substance of a charity‘s work, especially when oral, are inherently fragile—
each contact involves competition for the citizen‘s limited time, attention and
money.‖147 Leslie Espinoza makes a similar contention, noting that ―at least
theoretically, there is to some extent a limited ‗pool‘ of potential charitable
contributions.‖148 According to Espinoza, this constraint became visible in the
years following World War II, when ―[e]xponential growth in communication
and the mechanization of solicitation, both through direct mail appeals and
telephone appeals, opened new opportunities to reach donors and increased
competition for contributions.‖149 Because increased competition ―lowered
the revenues of established charities,‖150 these charities ―consciously
promoted‖ fund-raising limits ―to restrict diversity and competitiveness within
the charitable community.‖151 Under Espinoza‘s thesis, the states, persuaded
by larger established charities to enact greater regulation, actually diminished
the diversity of viewpoints in the charitable sector.
Espinoza‘s perspective is consistent with the Court‘s observation that
regulation of professional charitable solicitation disproportionately affects
small or unpopular charities.152 These charities include law enforcement
foundations, veterans groups, and social advocacy groups whose purposes are
unmistakably among those of core political speech: endorsing legislation,
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1)–(28) (2006) (containing extensive definitions as to which
entities qualify as ―exempt organizations‖).
147. Brief for Independent Sector et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Appellees, Riley v. Nat‘l
Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328). (―Amici include advocacy
organizations (of all political stripes), who also must overcome many citizens‘ discomfort with
troubling issues and viewpoints. Accordingly, any compelled disclosure, especially when on a topic
not chosen by the organization, tends to chill free speech by diverting the citizen‘s attention and
undercutting the good will that links solicitor and citizen.‖).
148. Espinoza, supra note 81, at 654.
149. Id. at 635.
150. Id. at 654.
151. Id. at 610. Espinoza highlights the protectionist bias of established charities that was
evident in a report issued by an ad hoc committee of academics and representatives from
corporations and nonprofit organizations. Id. at 650. This report advocated that service-oriented
charities would be better off with ―a smaller number and a greater joint effort.‖ Id. at 651 (quoting
VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY
BY AN AD HOC CITIZENS COMMITTEE 30 (R. Hamlin ed., 1961)).
152. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799.
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promoting messages and programs in the interest of public welfare and safety,
and furthering the causes of marginalized groups. Regulations that vanquish
these voices from the public square, whether directly or indirectly, endanger
―those processes of communication that must remain open to the participation
of citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.‖153
3. The Disparate Effects of Content-Neutral Regulation
Regulation of charitable solicitation will seldom if ever be content-based
under the current test for content analysis articulated in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism.154 The government will rarely attempt to regulate charitable
solicitation out of disagreement with the message it conveys, but will typically
do so in order to advance government interests unrelated to the content of
expression such as public safety, fraud prevention, or residential privacy. 155
Accordingly, these regulations will be subject to less than strict scrutiny. 156
But putative distinctions between content-neutral and content-based
regulations threaten diversity in the charitable sector because, as Kenneth
Karst has observed, ―regulations that are formally neutral as to speech
content‖ may result in ―de facto content discrimination.‖157 Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, expressed a similar concern in his dissent in Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, decided three days before Munson.
[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny of
governmental regulations once it has determined that [time,
place, and manner] regulations are content-neutral. The result
153. Post, supra note 41, at 7.
154. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
155. Government regulation of professional charitable solicitation may take the form of
subject-matter or speaker-based restrictions, but will seldom be viewpoint-discriminatory.
156. Of course, a regulation deemed to be content-based under Ward would be subject to strict
scrutiny and would likely be unsustainable.
157. Karst, supra note 13, at 35, 37. Karst viewed this kind of discrimination as
―presumptively invalid‖ under the First Amendment‘s ―equality principle.‖ Id. at 37. For Karst,
―[t]he principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support
for the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‗central meaning of the First Amendment.‘‖ Id.
at 21 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). A showing ―that a formally
neutral law has discriminatory effect deserves great weight in persuading a court to look closely at
the necessity for the regulation.‖ Id. at 39. For more on the concept of de facto differential effects of
content-neutral regulations, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 171 (Some content-neutral restrictions
―may foreclose important expressive outlets and have profound content-differential effects.‖); TRIBE,
supra note 9, at 682–83 (―Even a wholly neutral government regulation or policy, aimed entirely at
harms unconnected with the content of any communication, may be invalid if it leaves too little
breathing space for communicative activity, or leaves people with too little access to channels of
communication, whether as would-be speakers or would-be listeners.‖ (emphasis in original)); Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 221 (There can be ―de facto
content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions.‖).
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has been the creation of a two-tiered approach to First
Amendment cases: while regulations that turn on the content
of the expression are subjected to a strict form of judicial
review, regulations that are aimed at matters other than
expression receive only a minimal level of scrutiny. The
minimal scrutiny prong of this two-tiered approach has led to
an unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection.
By narrowly limiting its concern to whether a given
regulation creates a content-based distinction, the Court has
seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral restrictions
are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected
expressive activity. 158
Justice Marshall elaborated in a footnote:
[A] content-neutral regulation does not necessarily fall with
random or equal force upon different groups or different
points of view. A content-neutral regulation that restricts an
inexpensive mode of communication will fall most heavily
upon relatively poor speakers and the points of view that such
speakers typically espouse. 159
The problem with contemporary scrutiny of content-neutral regulations is
that it focuses on the legitimacy of the government‘s action but ignores the
impact of the regulation on the speaker. As Stephen Gottlieb has argued, the
Court‘s adoption of neutrality ―shifted its gaze‖ from the behavior of the
speaker which meant that ―many problems, such as . . . limitations on access
to information and access to opportunities for political broadcast and
inexpensive speech, [became] relatively less visible.‖ 160 Once the perspective
shifted from the behavior of the speaker to the behavior of government,
―governmental interests no longer had to be particularly weighty; they only
had to be pure.‖161

158. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id. at 313 n.14; see also Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 57 (―[T]he
Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of communication,
content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate their
views to others. This is a central first amendment concern: to the extent that content-neutral
restrictions actually have this effect, they necessarily dampen the search for truth, impede meaningful
participation in self-governance, and frustrate individual self-fulfillment.‖); cf. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 192 n.5.
160. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 34.
161. Id. at 36.
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In the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome regulations
usually threaten less established charities. The reason for this inverse
relationship is unsurprising: large charities often have either an established
donor base or sufficient in-house employees or volunteers to conduct
solicitations; small or unpopular charities, particularly those without a donor
base or name recognition, often have to undergo the ―necessary evil‖ of
relying on professional charitable solicitors. 162 The Supreme Court has also
recognized this reality, noting that some disfavored methods of solicitation are
―essential to the poorly financed causes of little people‖ 163 and that ―small or
unpopular charities‖ must ―usually rely on professional fundraisers.‖164 The
disparate effects of regulating charitable solicitation thus endanger the very
speakers that the First Amendment should most staunchly protect. A civic
conception of the First Amendment requires scrutiny of even a content-neutral
regulation to ensure that any disparate effects are considered in light of the
democratic project at stake.
B. The Need for Balancing
Kathleen Sullivan has observed that ―[t]he suspension of categorical
reasoning in favor of [intermediate scrutiny] typically comes about from a
crisis in analogical reasoning‖ when ―[a] set of cases comes along that just
can‘t be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality track.‖ 165
Schaumburg and its progeny fall within Sullivan‘s observation. 166 As a
practical matter, strict scrutiny of charitable solicitation regulation is
implausible under the Court‘s current framework for content analysis because
a regulation will almost never be aimed at the content of the charitable
message itself.167 More substantively, strict scrutiny could hinder the state
162. See Note, Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations (pt. 4), 105 HARV. L. REV.
1634, 1635 (1992).
163. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
164. Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 799 (1988).
165. Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (1992) (―‗Intermediate scrutiny,‘ unlike the poles of the two-tier
system, is an overtly balancing mode. . . . Where intermediate scrutiny governs, the outcome is no
longer foreordained at the threshold. Instead of winning always or never, the government may
sometimes win or sometimes lose—it all depends.‖); see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―We sometimes make . . . ‗balancing‘
judgments in determining how far the needs of the State can intrude upon the liberties of the
individual, but that is of the essence of the courts‘ function as the nonpolitical branch.‖ (citation
omitted)). But cf. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 583 (Strict scrutiny also involves a kind of balancing.).
166. Sullivan also points out that balancing has been vituperated by both liberal and
conservative jurists in different political contexts. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 316–17.
167. Even regulations that distinguish between professional charitable solicitors and in-house
solicitors are at most speaker-based restrictions, which ―are not always considered the practical
equivalent of content restrictions, so long as the ground on which speakers are classified can be
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from protecting important interests like fraud prevention and residential
privacy. Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, fails to account for the
fundamental speech interests at stake in charitable solicitation. 168 Balancing,
as an alternative, ―tends to make the articulation and comparison of competing
rights and interests more explicit.‖169 A carefully constructed balancing test—
despite the risk inherent in the discretion it leaves to individual judges—may
be preferable to either of the more rigid alternatives of strict or rational basis
scrutiny.170
C. Formulating a New Test
A judicial test for the regulation of charitable solicitation should account
for the concerns identified above. It should also reflect the principles of
content analysis and tiered scrutiny now ensconced in First Amendment law.
I turn now to constructing such a test, using as a starting point the Eighth
Circuit‘s decision in National Federation of the Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v.
Pryor.171
Pryor involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that required a
telephone charitable solicitor to end the solicitation when requested to do so
by the recipient of the call. 172 After examining Schaumburg and Ward, the
Eighth Circuit noted that the standards enunciated in those cases were
―obviously very similar.‖173 Without explicitly announcing its own test, the
court reviewed: (1) whether the state had a legitimate interest; (2) whether the
interest was significantly furthered by a regulation narrowly tailored to meet
that interest; and (3) whether the regulation substantially limited charitable
solicitation.174 These principles may be reformulated as follows:

described as related to some aspect of their status independent of their beliefs or points of view.‖
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 106, at 1199. Similarly, regulations restricting charitable
solicitation as a whole are at most subject matter restrictions, a classification that might be subject to
―a more variable sort of analysis.‖ Stone, supra note 6, at 100.
168. See Espinoza, supra note 81, at 612.
169. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 301.
170. Ely observed that ―balancing tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological
predispositions of those doing the balancing—or if not that, at least with the relative confidence or
paranoia of the age in which they are doing it—and we must build barriers as secure as words are
able to make them.‖ Ely, supra note 18, at 1501. Ely was writing specifically about regulations that
proscribe messages because they are dangerous, and although my invocation of his words
decontextualizes the quote, the abstracted principle retains its importance.
171. 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001).
172. Id. at 854.
173. Id. at 855.
174. Id. at 855–56.
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A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation will be
sustained if the regulation furthers a legitimate interest and
the interest is significantly furthered by a narrowly tailored
regulation that does not substantially limit charitable
solicitation.175
The critical prong of the Pryor test is whether the regulation ―substantially
limits‖ charitable solicitation. This emphasis forces a balancing of interests
because it examines the degree of the burden that the government‘s regulation
places on charitable speech. But while Pryor comes closer to a workable
standard than Schaumburg, it remains unsatisfactory for three reasons:
1. Pryor unnecessarily expands an already subjective intermediate
scrutiny review by supplanting Turner‘s ―important or substantial‖ interest
with a ―sufficient or legitimate‖ interest that hovers closer to rational basis
scrutiny than to an elevated standard of review. Although the important or
substantial formulation is itself malleable and subject to abuse, terminology
consistent with precedent provides a modicum of accountability.
2. Pryor‘s use of the phrase ―significantly furthers‖ unnecessarily
introduces an additional subjective factor to the test. If a regulation is
narrowly tailored to advance an important or substantial interest, a subjective
assessment of the degree to which the regulation advances that interest adds
little substantive value to the test. The ―significantly furthers‖ inquiry can
also unwittingly slip a strict scrutiny standard into an intermediate scrutiny
review. Suppose an unchallenged law requires a charity to disclose X in order
to advance the state‘s interest in preventing fraud. Suppose further that a new
law requiring the compelled disclosure of X + Y is challenged on First
Amendment grounds. Assuming that both regulations are content-neutral, the
state need not show that X + Y is the least restrictive means of advancing its
interest in fraud prevention. But if X + Y must significantly further the state‘s
interest, the charity could argue that, given the existence of X, the marginal
benefit of Y does not significantly further that interest. This leaves the state
with justification only for disclosure of X. The charity thus indirectly forces
the state to comply with a standard more akin to a least restrictive strict
scrutiny despite the content-neutrality of the regulation.176

175. Id. at 854–55. Although my formulation differs slightly from the test explicated by the
court at the beginning of Pryor, it is consistent with the language used by the court in its substantive
analysis.
176. A similar critique can be made of the commercial speech test developed in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561–66
(1980). Under Central Hudson‘s second prong, the government ―must demonstrate that the
challenged regulation ‗advances the Government‘s interest ―in a direct and material way.‖‘‖ Fla. Bar
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3. Pryor‘s ―substantial limitation‖ component tilts too restrictively against
the government. By intimating that a regulation cannot substantially limit
charitable solicitation, Pryor introduces a near-absolute presumption
reminiscent of strict scrutiny. Some content-neutral regulations may
justifiably substantially limit or even foreclose charitable solicitation, just as
some content-neutral regulations limit other forms of protected speech.
Precluding the government from any regulation that substantially limits
solicitation skews the balance against the government‘s ability to regulate.
Pryor‘s test can be modified to address the three concerns described above
by: (1) replacing ―sufficient or legitimate‖ with ―important or substantial‖; (2)
removing the ―significantly furthers‖ requirement; and (3) adding a balancing
component that is effectuated if the regulation substantially limits charitable
solicitation. These adjustments produce the following test:
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation will be
sustained if it furthers an important or substantial interest
through a narrowly tailored regulation that does not
substantially limit charitable solicitation (unless the harm the
regulation prevents clearly outweighs the harm caused by the
regulation‘s limitation).177
This test, of course, introduces its own vagaries. But premised on the need for
a balancing of interests, it is a more transparent representation of that
balancing. It also invites courts to consider the potentially disparate effects of
content-neutral restrictions.
The balancing component in the parenthetical of the proposed test is
conditional: it operates only when a regulation substantially limits charitable
solicitation. A narrowly tailored content-neutral regulation that furthers an
important or substantial government interest should be upheld if its limitation
on charitable solicitation is insubstantial. But the substantial limitation
requirement operates as a check against my elimination of Pryor‘s
requirement that a regulation significantly further the government interest.
Consider again a disclosure requirement X. Removing the ―significantly
furthers‖ requirement allows the state to regulate X + Y even if Y is only
marginally effective and therefore protects my test from becoming a de facto
least restrictive means test. But left unchecked, the state could rely on this
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625–26 (1995) (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))).
177. Although I confine this proposed test to the scope of this Article—charitable solicitation—
the test has potentially broader applicability as a modification of the intermediate scrutiny
formulation in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994).
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rationale to require disclosure of X + Y + Z and beyond. At some point, the
aggregate effect of these disclosures may cause considerable harm to a
charity. The substantial limitation language forces the parenthetical balancing
test when this occurs. When a court concludes that the limitation is
substantial, the balancing test favors the charitable speech over the restriction
by requiring that the harm prevented by the regulation clearly outweigh the
harm that it causes. This initial position accords with a speech-protective
view and signals to legislatures that they must account for the speaker‘s
interests in crafting their regulations.
The balancing component also recasts the government‘s stake from the
importance of the government interest to the harm that the regulation
prevents. The focus on harm encompasses both the gravity of the
government‘s interest and the regulation‘s effectiveness in furthering that
interest. In this way, the parenthetical in my proposed test recaptures the
―significantly furthers‖ aspect of Pryor, but this inquiry is only made when
the regulation substantially limits speech.
V. CONCLUSION
Although I have argued for a test that more adequately protects the values
of charitable solicitation, the Court‘s test is ostensibly already speechprotective: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley all struck down attempts to
regulate charitable solicitation. My critique, however, is structural rather than
results-oriented. I have argued that the test derived from Schaumburg lacks
coherence, clarity, and doctrinal sustainability. The most direct support for
my contention is the inability of lower courts even to agree whether the
Court‘s test is one of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. When
interpreted as the former, the test is inconsistent with the application of
content analysis in other areas of speech regulation. When interpreted as the
latter, Schaumburg fails to account adequately for the civic interests at stake
with charitable speech. My concern is the same that Robert Post has
expressed with respect to commercial speech:
Commercial speech doctrine is now almost a quarter of a
century old. Yet in all that time it has never systematically
queried its own justifications and implications. By settling
quickly and easily into a test whose bland provisions were
indifferent to a disciplined account of the constitutional value
of commercial speech, the doctrine has allowed fundamental
differences of perspective to fester and increase. These
differences now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely. 178
178. Post, supra note 41, at 54–55.
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My aim has been to propose an alternative test that reflects greater clarity
and transparency.179 My argument has been chiefly analytical, but it also
contains a normative element: the Court‘s inability to establish a coherent test
has exposed an important form of speech to an unwarranted risk of
overregulation. This assertion flows from my view that the protections of the
First Amendment should be at their highest for political speech and that
charitable solicitation is a kind of political speech. I have thus adopted a
broader conception of political speech than some. But I have also argued for
principled line-drawing that prevents an exceptional category of speech from
being swallowed by the whole. Thus, for example, I have contended that
neither begging nor commercial speech warrant the same level of protection
that should be extended to charitable solicitation. Others might argue that
both of those forms of speech contribute to a rich and diverse civic discourse
as much as charitable solicitation. These discussions need to be taking place
with greater frequency. Principled distinctions between different forms of
speech, and even distinctions between speech and non-speech, have become
increasingly thin. To take but one obvious example, we have amply
demonstrated that, when it comes to pornography, we haven‘t known it when
we‘ve seen it.180
Evolving technology will ensure that the regulation of charitable
solicitation remains a timely legal issue, 181 and First Amendment
jurisprudence must be capacious enough to resolve unforeseen challenges as
the speech interests underlying charitable solicitation continue to intersect in
new ways with competing interests. Left unaltered, Schaumburg‘s test may
be incapable of meeting those challenges; indeed, it may be reduced to an
―abstract concept‖ that becomes ―filled with whatever content and direction
one can manage to put into [it].‖ 182

179. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (rev. ed. 1969) (―The desideratum of
clarity represents one of the most essential ingredients of legality.‖).
180. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
181. See, e.g., FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 2003)
(upholding distinction between charitable and commercial solicitation under the national do-not-call
registry); see also First Spam and Spim, Now „Spit:‟ VoIP Annoyance Defies Regulatory
Categorization, 73 U.S. LAW WEEK, Nov. 30, 2004, at 2316 (describing ―spit‖ as ―a next-generation
annoyance that delivers unsolicited commercial messages to users of Internet telephony‖).
182. STANLEY FISH, THERE ‘S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT ‘S A GOOD THING, TOO
102 (1994).

